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DUAL-SERVER PUBLIC-KEY ENCRYPTION THROUGH KEYWORD SEARCH FOR SHELTERED CLOUD STORAGE

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ABSTRACT:

Searchable encryption is of increasing interest for protecting the data privacy in secure searchable cloud storage. In this work, we investigate the security of a well-known cryptographic primitive, namely Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) which is very useful in many applications of cloud storage. Unfortunately, it has been shown that the traditional PEKS framework suffers from an inherent insecurity called inside Keyword Guessing Attack (KGA) launched by the malicious server. To address this security vulnerability, we propose a new PEKS framework named Dual-Server Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (DS-PEKS). As another main contribution, we define a new variant of the Smooth Projective Hash Functions (SPHF) referred to as linear and homomorphic SPHF (LH-SPHF). We then show a generic construction of secure DS-PEKS from LH-SPHF. To illustrate the feasibility of our new framework, we provide an efficient instantiation of the general framework from a DDH-based LH-SPHF and show that it can achieve the strong security against inside KGA.

Key words-Cloud storage, Encryption, Keyword search, Hash function, Diffie-Hellman language

1 INTRODUCTION

Cloud storage outsourcing has become a popular application for enterprises and organizations to reduce the burden of maintaining big data in recent years. However, in reality, end users may not entirely trust the cloud storage servers and may prefer to encrypt their data before uploading them to the cloud server in order to protect the data privacy. This usually makes the data utilization more difficult than the traditional storage where data is kept in the absence of encryption. One of the typical solutions is the searchable encryption which allows the user to retrieve the encrypted documents that contain the user-specified keywords, where given the keyword trapdoor, the server can find the data required by the user without decryption. Searchable encryption can be realized in either symmetric or asymmetric encryption setting. In [2], Song et al. proposed keyword search on

ciphertext, known as Searchable symmetric Encryption (SSE) and afterwards several SSE schemes [3], [4] were designed for improvements. Although SSE schemes enjoy high efficiency, they suffer from complicated secret key distribution. Precisely, users have to securely share secret keys which are used for data encryption. Otherwise they are not able to share the encrypted data outsourced to the cloud. To resolve this problem, Boneh et al. [5] introduced a more flexible primitive, namely Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (PEKS) that enables a user to search encrypted data in the asymmetric encryption setting. In a PEKS system, using the receiver's public key, the sender attaches some encrypted keywords (referred to as PEKS ciphertexts) with the encrypted data. The receiver then sends the trapdoor of a to-be-searched keyword to the server for data searching. Given the trapdoor and the PEKS ciphertext, the server can test

whether the keyword underlying the PEKS ciphertext is equal to the one selected by the receiver. If so, the server sends the matching encrypted data to the receiver.

Related Work

In this subsection, we describe a classification of PEKS schemes based on their security.

Traditional PEKS. Following Boneh et al.'s seminal work [5], Abdalla et al. [8] formalized anonymous IBE (AIBE) and presented a generic construction of searchable encryption from AIBE. They also showed how to transfer a hierarchical

IBE (HIBE) scheme into a public key encryption with temporary keyword search (PETKS) where the trapdoor is only valid in a specific time interval. Waters [7] showed that the PEKS schemes based on bilinear map could be applied to build encrypted and searchable auditing logs. In order to construct a PEKS secure in the standard model, Khader [9] proposed a scheme based on the k -resilient IBE and also gave a construction supporting multiple-keyword search.

The first PEKS scheme without pairings was introduced by Di Crescenzo and Saraswat [11]. The construction is derived from Cocks' IBE scheme [12] which is not very practical.


Secure Channel Free PEKS. The original PEKS scheme [5] requires a secure channel to transmit the trapdoors. To overcome this limitation, Baek et al. [13] proposed a new PEKS scheme without requiring a secure channel, which is referred to as a secure channel-free PEKS (SCF-PEKS). The idea is to add the server's public/private key pair into a PEKS system. The keyword ciphertext and trapdoor are generated using the server's public key and hence only the server (designated tester) is able to perform the search. Rhee et al. [14] later enhanced Baek et al.'s security model [13]

for SCF-PEKS where the attacker is allowed to obtain the relationship between the non-challenge ciphertexts and the trapdoor. They also presented an SCF-PEKS scheme secure under the enhanced security model in the random oracle model. Another extension on SCF-PEKS is by Emura et al.

[15]. They enhanced the security model by introducing the adaptively secure SCF-PEKS, wherein an adversary is allowed to issue test queries adaptively.

Against Outside KGA. Byun et al. [16] introduced the offline keyword guessing attack against PEKS as keywords are chosen from a much smaller space than passwords and users usually use well-known keywords for searching documents. They also pointed out that the scheme proposed in Boneh et al. [5] was susceptible to keyword guessing attack. Inspired by the work of Byun et al. [16], Yau et al. [17] demonstrated that outside adversaries that capture the trapdoors sent in a public channel can reveal the encrypted keywords through off-line keyword guessing attacks and they also showed off-line keyword guessing attacks against the (SCF-)PEKS schemes in [13], [18]. The first PEKS scheme secure against outside keyword guessing attacks was proposed by Rhee et al. [19]. In [20], the notion of trapdoor indistinguishability was proposed and the authors showed that trapdoor indistinguishability is a sufficient condition for preventing outside keyword-guessing attacks. Fang et al. [21] proposed a concrete SCF-PEKS scheme with (outside) KGA resilience. Similar to the work in [15], they also considered the adaptive test oracle in their proposed security definition.

SYSTEM MODEL



As illustrated in Fig. 4, an SPHF is defined based on a domain

X and an NP language L , where L contains a subset of the elements of the domain X , i.e., $L \subseteq X$. Formally, an SPHF system over a language $L \subseteq X$, onto a set Y , is defined by the following five algorithms (SPHFSetup; HashKG, ProjKG; Hash; ProjHash):

- SPHFSetup(1): generates the global parameters $param$ and the description of an NP language instance

- L ; HashKG(L ; $param$): generates a hashing key hk for L ;
- ProjKG(hk ; (L ; $param$)): derives the projection key hp from the hashing key hk ;

- Hash(hk ; (L ; $param$); W): outputs the hash value $h_v \in Y$ for the word W from the hashing key hk ;

- ProjHash(hp ; (L ; $param$); W ; w): outputs the hash value $h_v \in Y$ for the word W from the projection key hp and the witness w for the fact that $W \in L$.

Fig. 4. Smooth Projective Hash Function

The correctness of an SPHF requires that for a word $W \in L$ with w the witness, $Hash(hk; (L; param); W) = ProjHash(hp; (L; param); W; w)$. Another property of SPHFs is smoothness, which means that

for any $W \in X \setminus L$, the following two distributions are statistically indistinguishable:

$$V_1 = f(L; param; W; hp; h_v) \quad h_v = Hash(hk; (L; param); W); g;$$

$$V_2 = f(L; param; W; hp; h_v) \quad h_v \in Y$$

In summary, an SPHF has the property that the projection key uniquely determines the hash value of any word in the language L but gives almost no information about the hash value for any point in $X \setminus L$. In this paper, we require another important property of smooth projective hash functions that was introduced in [6]. Precisely, we require the SPHF to be pseudo-random. That is, if a word $W \in L$, then without the corresponding witness w , the distribution of the hash output is computationally indistinguishable from a uniform distribution in the view of any polynomial-time adversary. In this section, we first give a comparison between existing schemes and our scheme in terms of computation, size and security. We then evaluate its performance in experiments.

Computation Costs. As shown in Table 1, all the existing schemes [5], [10], [20] require the pairing computation during the generation of PEKS ciphertext and testing and hence are less efficient than our scheme, which does not need any pairing computation. In our scheme, the computation cost of PEKS generation, trapdoor generation and testing are $4Exp_{G1} + 1Hash_{G1} + 2Mul_{G1}$, $4Exp_{G1} + 1Hash_{G1} + 2Mul_{G1}$, and $7Exp_{G1} + 3Mul_{G1}$ respectively, where Exp_{G1} denotes the cost of one exponentiation in $G1$, Mul_{G1} denotes the cost of one multiplication in $G1$, and $Hash_{G1}$ denotes the cost of one hashing operation in $G1$.

In this paper, we proposed a new framework, named Dual-Server Public Key Encryption with Keyword Search (DSPEKS), that can prevent the inside keyword guessing attack which is an inherent vulnerability of the traditional PEKS framework. We also introduced a new Smooth Projective Hash Function (SPHF) and used it to construct a generic DSPEKS

scheme. An efficient instantiation of the new SPHFbased on the Diffie-Hellman problem is also presented in the paper, which gives an efficient DS-PEKS scheme without pairings

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