

COPY RIGHT



ELSEVIER
SSRN

2018IJIEMR. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IJIEMR must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. No Reprint should be done to this paper, all copy right is authenticated to Paper Authors

IJIEMR Transactions, online available on 25th Dec 2018. Link

[:http://www.ijiemr.org/downloads.php?vol=Volume-07&issue=ISSUE-13](http://www.ijiemr.org/downloads.php?vol=Volume-07&issue=ISSUE-13)

Title: **ATTRIBUTE-BASED STORAGE SUPPORTING SECURE DEDUPLICATION OF ENCRYPTED DATA IN CLOUD**

Volume 07, Issue 13, Pages: 709–714.

Paper Authors

¹SHAIKISMAIL,

²MD.SAMEERUDDIN KHAN



USE THIS BARCODE TO ACCESS YOUR ONLINE PAPER

ATTRIBUTE-BASED STORAGE SUPPORTING SECURE DEDUPLICATION OF ENCRYPTED DATA IN CLOUD

¹SHAIKISMAIL, ²MD.SAMEERUDDIN KHAN

¹Mtech student Sree Dattha Institute of Engineering and Science

²Professor Sree Dattha Institute of Engineering and Science

ABSTRACT:

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has been widely used in cloud computing where a data provider outsources his/her encrypted data to a cloud service provider, and can share the data with users possessing specific credentials (or attributes). However, the standard ABE system does not support secure deduplication, which is crucial for eliminating duplicate copies of identical data in order to save storage space and network bandwidth. In this paper, we present an attribute-based storage system with secure deduplication in a hybrid cloud setting, where a private cloud is responsible for duplicate detection and a public cloud manages the storage. Compared with the prior data deduplication systems, our system has two advantages. Firstly, it can be used to confidentially share data with users by specifying access policies rather than sharing decryption keys. Secondly, it achieves the standard notion of semantic security for data confidentiality while existing systems only achieve it by defining a weaker security notion.

1. INTRODUCTION

Cloud computing greatly facilitates data providers who want to outsource their data to the cloud without disclosing their sensitive data to external parties and would like users with certain credentials to be able to access the data. This requires data to be stored in encrypted forms with access control policies such that no one except users with attributes (or credentials) of specific forms can decrypt the encrypted data. An encryption technique that meets this requirement is called attribute-based encryption (ABE), where a user's private key is associated with an attribute set, a message is encrypted under an access policy (or access structure) over a set of attributes, and a user can decrypt a

ciphertext with his/her private key if his/her set of attributes satisfies the access policy associated with this ciphertext. However, the standard ABE system fails to achieve secure deduplication, which is a technique to save storage space and network bandwidth by eliminating redundant copies of the encrypted data stored in the cloud. On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, existing constructions for secure deduplication are not built on attribute-based encryption. Nevertheless, since ABE and secure deduplication have been widely applied in cloud computing, it would be desirable to design a cloud storage system possessing both properties.

An encryption technique that meets this requirement is called attribute-based encryption (ABE), where a user's private key is associated with an attribute set, a message is encrypted under an access policy (or access structure) over a set of attributes, and a user can decrypt a ciphertext with his/her private key if his/her set of attributes satisfies the access policy associated with this ciphertext. However, the standard ABE system fails to achieve secure deduplication, which is a technique to save storage space and network bandwidth by eliminating redundant copies of the encrypted data stored in the cloud. On the other hand, to the best of our knowledge, existing constructions for secure deduplication are not built on attribute-based encryption. Nevertheless, since ABE and secure deduplication have been widely applied in cloud computing, it would be desirable to design a cloud storage system possessing both properties.

2. PROBLEM DEFINITION

System and Security Model We propose the system high security is provided. The file can be uploaded only one time. User can't download without admin permission. It improves storage capacity in the cloud. Any types of file can be uploaded using encryption and decryption algorithm. The overall deduplication process. The user can upload the files in cloud computing nodes and check this files already there in the database. If already there that file cannot be uploaded if else uploaded the file using encryption algorithm (AES, DES, SHA).




Figure 1. System Model

AES

The Advanced Encryption Standard is the more popular and most adopted symmetric encryption algorithm like Advanced Encryption Standard (AES). It is found at least six times faster than 3DES. Nowadays AES is an iterative with Feistel cipher structure. It is based on a substitution-permutation network. It comprises of a series of operations, some of which involving replace the inputs by specific outputs (substitutions) and others involve shuffling bits around. All encrypted values are stored in database as key-value pair (key is token number another value is document part).

Encrypted Data Update

In this module used to update the encrypted data in cloud by the data owner. Only authorized user can access this files. This module provide the high security and avoid the redundancy.

Share Document's

In this module user can view all uploaded document and also share our document to community users. One of the major advantages of our project is Data lineage. All stored data must be based on Data Lineage concept. Data Lineage means share one copy of data to all users and also maintain all

accessed consumer information in dataset. In this way we can avoid Duplications and easy to identify data leakage. Effectively manage Database memory.

GOALS

- The file can be uploaded only one time. User can't download without admin permission.
- It improves storage capacity in the cloud. Any types of file can be uploaded using encryption and decryption algorithm.

ALOGIRTHMS

Symmetric Encryption

A symmetric encryption (SE) scheme SE with a key space K and a message space M [30] is composed of two algorithms: an encryption algorithm $SE.Enc(K, m)$ which outputs a ciphertext CT on input a key $K \in K$ and a message $m \in M$, and a decryption algorithm $SE.Dec(K, CT)$ which outputs a message m or a failure symbol \perp on input a key $K \in K$ and a ciphertext CT . Let st be the state information. A symmetric encryption scheme SE is secure under chosen plaintext attacks (INDCPA secure), if for any PPT adversary $A = (A_1, A_2)$, the advantage function.

$$Adv_{SE, A}^{IND-CPA}(\lambda) = \Pr \left[\begin{array}{l} K \leftarrow \mathcal{K}; b \leftarrow \{0, 1\} \\ (m_0, m_1, st) \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_1(1^\lambda) \\ CT^* \leftarrow SE.Enc(K, m_b) \\ b' \leftarrow \mathcal{A}_2(par, m_0, m_1, st, CT^*) \end{array} \right] - 1/2$$

negligible in the security parameter λ , where $|m_0| = |m_1|$.

3. PROBLEM SOLUTON

PROPOSED SYSTEM

A data provider wants to outsource his/her datato the cloud and share it with users possessing certaincredentials. The AA issues every user a decryption keyassociated with his/her set of attributes. The cloud consists of a public cloud which is in charge of data storage and a private cloud which performs certain computation such as tag checking. When sending a file storage request, each data provider firstly creates a tag T and a label L associated with the data, and then encrypts the data under an access structure over a set of attributes. Also, each data provider generates a proof pf on the relationship of the tag T , the label L and the encrypted message ,but this proof will not be stored anywhere in the cloud and is only used during the checking phase for any newly generated storage request. After receiving a storage request, the private cloud first checks the validity of the proof pf , and then tests the equality of the new tag T with existing tags in the system. If there is no match for this new tag T , the private cloud adds the tag T and the label L to a tag-label list, and forwards the label and the encrypted data, (L, ct) to the public cloud for storage. Otherwise, let ct_0 be the ciphertext whose tag matches the new tag and L_0 be the label associated with ct_0 and then the private cloud executes as follows.

- If the access policy in ct is a subset of that in ct_0 the private cloud simply discards the new storage request; else, if the access policy in ct_0 is a subset of that in ct , the private cloud asks the public cloud to replace the stored pair (L_0, ct_0) with the new pair (L, ct) where $L = L_0$.

- If the access policies in ct and ct_0 are not mutually contained, the private cloud runs the ciphertext regeneration algorithm to yield

a new ciphertext for the same underlying plaintext file and associated with an access structure which is the union of the two access.

4. CONCLUSIONS

Attribute-based encryption (ABE) has been widely used in cloud computing where data providers outsource their encrypted data to the cloud and can share the data with users possessing specified credentials. On the other hand, deduplication is an important technique to save the storage space and network bandwidth, which eliminates duplicate copies of identical data. However, the standard ABE systems do not support secure deduplication, which makes them costly to be applied in some commercial storage services. In this paper, we presented a novel approach to realize an attribute-based storage system supporting secure deduplication. Our storage system is built under a hybrid cloud architecture, where a private cloud manipulates the computation and a public cloud manages the storage. The private cloud is provided with a trapdoor key associated with the corresponding ciphertext, with which it can transfer the ciphertext over one access policy into ciphertext of the same plaintext under any other access policies without being aware of the underlying plaintext. After receiving a storage request, the private cloud first checks the validity of the uploaded item through the attached proof. If the proof is valid, the private cloud runs a tag matching algorithm to see whether the same data underlying the ciphertext has been stored. If so, whenever it is necessary, it regenerates the ciphertext into a ciphertext of the same plaintext over an access policy which is the union set of both access policies. The proposed storage system enjoys

two major advantages. Firstly, it can be used to confidentially share data with other users by specifying an access policy rather than sharing the decryption key. Secondly, it achieves the standard notion of semantic security while existing deduplication schemes only achieve it under a weaker security notion.

REFERENCES

- [1] D. Quick, B. Martini, and K. R. Choo, *Cloud Storage Forensics*. Syngress Publishing / Elsevier, 2014. [Online]. Available: <http://www.elsevier.com/books/cloudstorageforensics/quick/978-0-12-419970-5>
- [2] K. R. Choo, J. Domingo-Ferrer, and L. Zhang, "Cloud cryptography: Theory, practice and future research directions," *Future Generation Comp. Syst.*, vol. 62, pp. 51–53, 2016.
- [3] K. R. Choo, M. Herman, M. Iorga, and B. Martini, "Cloud forensics: State-of-the-art and future directions," *Digital Investigation*, vol. 18, pp. 77–78, 2016.
- [4] Y. Yang, H. Zhu, H. Lu, J. Weng, Y. Zhang, and K. R. Choo, "Cloudbased data sharing with fine-grained proxy re-encryption," *Pervasive and Mobile Computing*, vol. 28, pp. 122–134, 2016.
- [5] D. Quick and K. R. Choo, "Google drive: Forensic analysis of data remnants," *J. Network and Computer Applications*, vol. 40, pp. 179–193, 2014.
- [6] A. Sahai and B. Waters, "Fuzzy identity-based encryption," in *Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2005*, 24th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic

Techniques, Aarhus, Denmark, May 22-26, 2005, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 3494. Springer, 2005, pp. 457–473.

[7] B. Zhu, K. Li, and R. H. Patterson, “Avoiding the disk bottleneck in the data domain deduplication file system,” in 6th USENIX Conference on File and Storage Technologies, FAST 2008, February 26- 29, 2008, San Jose, CA, USA. USENIX, 2008, pp. 269–282.

[8] M. Bellare, S. Keelveedhi, and T. Ristenpart, “Message-locked encryption and secure deduplication,” in Advances in Cryptology- EUROCRYPT 2013, 32nd Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Athens, Greece, May 26-30, 2013. Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7881. Springer, 2013, pp. 296–312.

[9] M. Abadi, D. Boneh, I. Mironov, A. Raghunathan, and G. Segev, “Message-locked encryption for lock-dependent messages,” in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2013 - 33rd Annual Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, CA, USA, August 18-22, 2013. Proceedings, Part I, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 8042. Springer, 2013, pp. 374–391.

[10] S. Keelveedhi, M. Bellare, and T. Ristenpart, “Dupless: Serveraided encryption for deduplicated storage,” in Proceedings of the 22th USENIX Security Symposium, Washington, DC, USA, August 14-16, 2013. USENIX Association, 2013, pp. 179–194.

[11] M. Bellare and S. Keelveedhi, “Interactive message-locked encryption and secure deduplication,” in Public-Key

Cryptography – PKC 2015 - 18th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory in Public-Key Cryptography, Gaithersburg, MD, USA, March 30 – April 1, 2015, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 9020. Springer, 2015, pp. 516–538.

[12] S. Bugiel, S. Nurnberger, A. Sadeghi, and T. Schneider, “Twin “ clouds: Secure cloud computing with low latency - (full version),” in Communications and Multimedia Security, 12th IFIP TC 6 / TC 11 International Conference, CMS 2011, Ghent, Belgium, October 19- 21,2011. Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 7025. Springer, 2011, pp. 32–44.

[13] S. Goldwasser, S. Micali, and C. Rackoff, “The knowledge complexity of interactive proof-systems (extended abstract),” in Proceedings of the 17th Annual ACM Symposium on Theory of Computing, May 6-8, 1985, Providence, Rhode Island, USA. ACM, 1985, pp. 291–304.

[14] M. Fischlin and R. Fischlin, “Efficient non-malleable commitment schemes,” in Advances in Cryptology - CRYPTO 2000, 20th Annual International Cryptology Conference, Santa Barbara, California, USA, August 20-24, 2000, Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 1880. Springer, 2000, pp. 413–431.

[15] S. Goldwasser and S. Micali, “Probabilistic encryption,” J. Comput. Syst. Sci., vol. 28, no. 2, pp. 270–299, 1984.

[16] V. Goyal, O. Pandey, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryption for fine-grained access control of encrypted data,” in Proceedings of the 13th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security,

CCS 2006, Alexandria, VA, USA, October 30 - November 3, 2006, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 5126. Springer, 2006, pp. 89–98.

[17] R. Ostrovsky, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Attribute-based encryption with non-monotonic access structures,” in Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2007, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, October 28-31, 2007. ACM, 2007, pp. 195–203.

[18] A. B. Lewko and B. Waters, “Unbounded HIBE and attribute based encryption,” in Advances in Cryptology - EUROCRYPT 2011 - 30th Annual International Conference on the Theory and Applications of Cryptographic Techniques, Tallinn, Estonia, May 15-19, 2011. Proceedings, ser. Lecture Notes in Computer Science, vol. 6632. Springer, 2011, pp. 547–567.

[19] J. Bethencourt, A. Sahai, and B. Waters, “Ciphertext-policy attribute-based encryption,” in 2007 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy (S&P 2007), 20-23 May 2007, Oakland, California, USA. IEEE Computer Society, 2007, pp. 321–334.

[20] L. Cheung and C. C. Newport, “Provably secure ciphertext policy ABE,” in Proceedings of the 2007 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security, CCS 2007, Alexandria, Virginia, USA, October 28-31, 2007. ACM, 2007, pp. 456–465.

[21] V. Goyal, A. Jain, O. Pandey, and A. Sahai, “Bounded ciphertext policy attribute based encryption,” in Automata, Languages and Programming, 35th International Colloquium, ICALP 2008, Reykjavik