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Title Enhancing Security and Accountability in Encrypted Cloud Storage: Mitigating EDoS Attacks and Enabling Controlled Access

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Enhancing Security and Accountability in Encrypted Cloud Storage: Mitigating EDoS Attacks and Enabling Controlled Access

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ABSTRACT

Cloud computing's immense potential is acknowledged by people, yet there exists a fundamental distrust in cloud providers' ability to safeguard privacy-sensitive data due to the lack of control users have over their data in the cloud. To address this concern, encrypted data is often outsourced by data owners instead of sharing plaintexts. To facilitate controlled sharing of encrypted files with specific users, Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE) is employed for precise access control that is centered around the data owner. However, this approach has shown vulnerabilities to various attacks, necessitating a more comprehensive security solution. In many existing schemes, cloud providers lack the capability to verify whether a downloader has decryption privileges. Consequently, these files end up being accessible to anyone who can access the cloud storage, raising the risk of malicious entities launching Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attacks. Such attacks can lead to excessive consumption of cloud resources, with the cost burden falling on the payer of the cloud service. Additionally, the cloud provider functions as both the resource counter and recipient of the consumption fees, lacking transparency to data owners. These issues require resolution to ensure the viability of public cloud storage in real-world scenarios. This study introduces a novel approach aimed at fortifying the security of encrypted cloud storage against EDoS attacks, while simultaneously establishing accountability for resource consumption. The approach leverages CP-ABE schemes in a manner that maintains the integrity of the data, accommodating arbitrary access policies associated with CP-ABE. To achieve this, we present two distinct protocols tailored for different usage scenarios. A comprehensive analysis of both performance and security aspects accompanies these protocols.

Keywords: Cloud storage, combining data owner side, cloud side access, Economic Denial of Sustainability.

1. INTRODUCTION

Cloud storage has many benefits, such as always-online, pay-as-you-go, and cheap. During these years, more data are outsourced to public cloud for persistent storage, including personal and business documents. It brings a security concern to data owners: the public cloud is not trusted, and the outsourced data should not be leaked to the cloud provider without the permission from data owners.

Many storage systems use server-dominated access control, like password-based and certificate-based authentication. They overly trust the cloud provider to protect their sensitive data. The cloud providers and their employees can read any document regardless of data owners' access policy. Besides, the cloud provider can exaggerate the resource consumption of the file storage and charge the payers more without providing verifiable records, since we lack a system for verifiable

computation of the resource usage. Relying on the existing server-dominated access control is not secure. Data owners who store files on cloud servers still want to control the access on their own hands and keep the data confidential against the cloud provider and malicious users.

1.1 Encryption is not sufficient

To add the confidentiality guarantee, data owners can encrypt the files and set an access policy so that only qualified users can decrypt the document. With Ciphertext-Policy Attribute-based Encryption (CP-ABE), we can have both fine-grained access control and strong confidentiality. However, this access control is only available for data owners, which turn out to be insufficient. If the cloud provider cannot authenticate users before downloading, like in many existing CP-ABE cloud storage systems, the cloud has to allow everyone to download to ensure availability. This makes the storage system vulnerable to the resource-exhaustion attacks. If we resolve this problem by having data owners authenticate the downloader's before allowing them to download, we lose the flexibility of access control from CP-ABE. Here lists the two problems should be addressed in our work.

- **Problem I: resource-exhaustion attack:** If the cloud cannot do cloud-side access control, it has to allow anyone, including malicious attackers, to freely download, although only some users can decrypt. The server is vulnerable to resource-exhaustion attacks. When malicious users launch the DoS/DDoS attacks to the cloud storage, the resource consumption will increase. Payers (in pay-as-you-go model) have to pay for the increased consumption contributed by those attacks, which is a considerable and unreasonable financial burden. The attack has been introduced as Economic Denial of Sustainability

(EDoS), which means payers are financially attacked eventually. In addition, even files are encrypted, unauthorized downloads can reduce security by bringing convenience to offline analysis and leaking information like file length or update frequency.

- **Problem II: resource consumption accountability:** In the pay-as-you-go model, users pay money to the cloud provider for storage services. The fee is decided by resource usage. However, CP-ABE based schemes for cloud storage access control does not make online confirmations to the data owner before download. It is needed for the cloud service provider to prove to the payers about the actual resource usage. Otherwise, the cloud provider can charge more without being discovered.

1.2 Summary of Challenges and Approaches

Challenge I: modelling the cloud provider: Many existing CP-ABE based schemes, model the cloud providers (like Google, Amazon, Microsoft Azure) as semi-honest adversaries or passive attackers. However, such a definition is restricted, and it excludes some possible attacks in the real world, such as exaggerated resource usage. To model such attacks, we consider a less restricted security model, covert adversary, for the cloud provider.

In practice, the cloud services are usually provided by some big IT enterprises like Google, Amazon, and Microsoft. They need to maintain good reputation and promise secure cloud storage services to their customers. If any attempt the cloud provider deviates from the protocol is supposed to be caught with a possibility (e.g., $p = 0.001$), the cloud provider dares not to cheat. Because being caught will not only violate the service contracts, but also lead to media exposure and destroys the

reputation. Aware of the aftermath, the cloud provider has to refrain from attacking, as the cheating can be detected. This model, covert security, has been used in many secure systems.

Note that the covert security model is different with the semi-honest model. The semi-honest model, which is widely used in proxies and cloud providers, is a model that resides between “malicious” and “trusted”. It models a party that observes all data, but it never executes the wrong program. Such a party will not cheat by definition, even if no other parties can detect its cheating. The covert model, which resides between “malicious” and “semi-honest”, models this party differently. It will not execute the wrong program only if there is a mechanism to detect its cheating. If no detection exists in the system, the party may even compromise the data, for example. Therefore, it is more practical for public cloud storage.

Approach: model cloud providers as covert adversaries, and design protocols resilient to a covert adversary.

Challenge II: compatible with existing systems

There are many constructions and variants for CP-ABE. We don't design a new variant of CP-ABE to resolve the first challenge, as it is hard to achieve all the functionalities in these systems and also, it's not necessary. Besides the functionalities, some variants provide additional security and privacy guarantee. For example, the literatures hide the access policy. If the cloud-side access control makes the cloud provider knowing the access policy, it is not considered secure and compatible. It requires the cloud-side access control to be zero-knowledge for arbitrary CP-ABE schemes.

Approach: use CP-ABE in a syntactical and black-box way and ensure the construction not leaking policy and attributes. The system only

learns whether the user is legitimate or not, and nothing else.

Challenge III: minimal performance overhead

To protect the cloud storage effectively against the resource-exhaustion attack, the cloud-side access control needs to be efficient and lightweight, otherwise if the cloud server spends, for example 20ms, executing the cloud-side access control, it will become a computational resource exhaustion attack, which can be used by malicious attackers for DDoS and EDoS. The performance overhead being small also benefits the data users who download the files from the cloud storage, making the computation not approachable to resource-limited devices.

Approach: design an efficient access control for the cloud provider which should not add too much overhead.

1.3 Our work and Contribution

In this study, we've innovatively merged cloud-based access control with existing data owner-controlled CP-ABE based access control. The aim is to tackle the security challenges associated with privacy-preserving cloud storage. Our approach effectively thwarts EDoS attacks by empowering the cloud server to verify user authorization using a CP-ABE based scheme, all while safeguarding sensitive information from exposure. To achieve cloud-side access control, we've introduced a challenge-response mechanism using CP-ABE encryption/decryption. When a data owner uploads an encrypted file, they generate a set of random challenge plaintexts along with their corresponding ciphertexts. These ciphertexts are tied to the same access policy as the specific file. When a new data user enters the scene, the cloud server prompts them to decrypt randomly selected challenge ciphertexts. Successful decryption implies CP-ABE authorization, enabling the user to

download the file. To ensure the practicality and effectiveness of our solution in real-world scenarios, we present two access control protocols that synergize cloud-side and data owner-side approaches. The key contributions of our work can be summarized as follows:

- We put forth a comprehensive solution that fortifies encrypted cloud storage against EDoS attacks, all the while offering fine-grained access control and accountability for resource consumption. This is a pioneering effort in identifying the link between inadequate cloud-side access control in encrypted cloud storage and the susceptibility to EDoS attacks, along with proposing a viable remedy. Importantly, our solution is adaptable to a range of CP-ABE schemes.
- Acknowledging the diversity in data owner online patterns and performance considerations, we introduce two distinct protocols for authentication and resource consumption tracking. To enhance efficiency without compromising security, we incorporate techniques such as bloom filters and probabilistic checks.
- Unlike many existing encrypted cloud storage frameworks that presume a semi-honest cloud provider, we adopt a more pragmatic threat model by considering the cloud provider as a covert adversary. This significantly boosts security assurances.

2. LITERATURE SURVEY

To conduct a fine-grained data owner-side access control in public cloud storage, which is semi-honest, Attribute-based Encryption (ABE) [1-3] is introduced [4]. Among ABE schemes, CP-ABE [1], [5] is practical in public cloud storage, in which the ciphertext is encrypted under an access policy and only

users whose attributes satisfy the access policy can decrypt the ciphertext. Subsequently, many variants and relevant protocols [6-9] have been proposed to make CP-ABE more suitable for real scenarios with rich functionalities and security properties in public cloud storage.

The cryptography-driven access control does not protect the cloud provider against many other attacks. Since the cloud provider does not conduct the access control, it cannot stop those unauthorized users. One attack that is originated from this limitation is Distributed Denial of Services (DDoS). The power of DDoS attacks has been showed to incur significant resource consumption in CPU, memory, I/O, and network [10]. The attacks can exist in public clouds [11-14]. In [12], the limitation of cloud-side static resource allocation model is analyzed, including the risk of Economic Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attacks, which is the case of DDoS attacks in the cloud setting in [14], or the Fraudulent Resource Consumption (FRC) attack in [11]. These attacks are intended to break the budget of public cloud customers.

Some existing works try to mitigate EDoS attacks [15, 16]. In [15], the authors proposed a mitigation technique by verifying whether a request comes from a cloud user or is generated by bots. In [16], the authors proposed an attribute-based way to identify malicious clients. They treat the underlying application in a black box and do not fully immunize the attack in the algorithmic and protocol level. Some existing works discuss the necessary of accounting resource consumption in the public cloud arouses some concerns. In the literature [17], the authors discussed key issues and challenges about how to achieve accountability in cloud computing.

In the literature [18], the authors surveyed existing accounting and accountability in content distribution architectures. In the literatures [19] and [20], the authors

respectively proposed a systematic approach for verifiable resource accounting in cloud computing. However, the accounting approach involves changes to the system model, and requires the anonymous verification of users, which is not supported in previous systems. Compared with relevant schemes, our approach works on the protocol level to provide the resource verifiability that relies on authorized users who satisfy the CP-ABE policy and achieves the covert security which is more practical and secure.

3. PROPOSED SCHEME

3.1 Overview of our scheme

To achieve the security requirements, the scheme consists of two components: 1) A cloud-side access control to block users whose attribute set \mathcal{A}_i does not satisfy the access policy A ; 2) A proof-collecting subsystem where the cloud provider can collect the proofs of resource consumption from users, and present to the data owners later. In real-world scenarios, it is reasonable to specify an expected maximal download time, and data owners can remain offline unless it wants to increase this value. This leads to our first protocol: Partially Outsourced Protocol (POP) (V-B). In some other cases where the data owner cannot set expectations of download times or would be offline for a long time, the data owner can delegate to the cloud. This leads to our second protocol: Fully Outsourced Protocol (FOP) (V-C).

3.2 Partially Outsourced Protocol (POP)

In this protocol, the data owner encrypts an ephemeral key in CP-ABE, which is then used for message encryption/decryption and cloud-side access control. The data owner provides the cloud provider with N challenge ciphertexts $\{enchal_i\}_{i \in [N]}$ and the hashed challenges $\{hash_i\}_{i \in [N]}$. The user proves the legitimacy to the cloud provider by showing the decryption result $chal_j$ of the randomly

selected unused challenge ciphertext $enchal_j$ is a preimage of $hash_j$. If the user response is valid, the cloud provider stores the user response for further resource consumption accounting.

Furthermore, to boost the efficiency and together reduce the storage space, we introduce the bloom filter for data owners to store their challenge plaintexts. This bloom filter can be stored locally or remotely on the cloud server. As the process of challenge update should be implemented on demand or periodically by the data owner, which cannot be outsourced to the cloud, we call the scheme as Partially Outsourced Protocol (POP).

The procedure of POP is described in detail as follows:

- 1) Encrypt and Upload (POP-EU): This operation is implemented by an individual data owner independently
- 2) Cloud-side Access Control: POP-CR.
- 3) Challenge update (POP-SU): If the specified upper bound of download times (N) has not yet reached, there is no need to update. But if the data owner wants to provide additional challenges, either on-demand or periodically, both only needs to be online for a short period, it is also supported. The update process is the same as that in the phase of POP-EU-2 under the same key k . We assume the data owner keeps a record of session keys either in local storage or outsourced to cloud in an encrypted form. As the plaintext space for challenges is sufficiently large, we assume no duplicated challenge plaintexts are generated. The bloom filter (and its encryption form) introduced in POP-EU-3 will be reconstructed.
- 4) Resource Accounting (POP-RA): data owners and the cloud interactively implement this operation.

3.3 Fully Outsourced Protocol (FOP)

If we cannot expect the file download times, we can outsource the challenge update to the cloud. In this section, we give a protocol based on signature algorithm, which has both the outsourced challenges generation/update and resource accounting without an external PKI, therefore we name it as Fully Outsourced Protocol (FOP).

Compared with POP, we have two main differences: 1) Instead of having the data owners generate the challenges $\{enchal_i\}_{i \in [N]}$, the challenges are generated by the cloud; 2) The data owners generate a pair of signature keys (vk,sk) for every file, with which legitimate users sign a confirmation to prove the resource consumption. The main procedure of FOP is described as follows:

- 1) Encrypt and Upload (FOP-EU)
- 2) Outsourced Challenge Generation (FOP-CG): In FOP, the cloud provider generates the challenges, which is different from POP. The generation can be done in advance or on demand.
- 3) Challenge-Response (FOP-CR). Data owners and the cloud run this operation
- 4) Resource Accounting (FOP-RA). This operation is interactively implemented by the data owner and the cloud.

3.4 System modules

Cloud Computing allow users to store or access data from anywhere and anytime with cheap cost. All data storage at cloud side will be at security risk due to unavailable control of data owner on store data. To provide security to data many data security algorithms are introduce and the most famous one is CP-ABE (Cipher Policy Attribute Based Encryption). In this algorithm data owner can encrypt data by specifying attributes of those users who can access data and the CP-ABE will generate encryption public and private keys by using those attributes and then encrypt and upload data to cloud. Any user with access control can

request file from the cloud and then download that file and if user has permission in his attributes, then file will be decrypted otherwise file will not be decrypted. With this algorithm access control and data security can be achieve but the drawback of CP-ABE is first it allows user to download file whether it has permission or not and after download he can decrypt the file if he has permission. Due to file downloading prior decryption can raise Economical Denial of Sustainability (EDoS) attack. In this attack malicious users will download files (attackers know they cannot decrypt file but still to raise problems they will download files to make cloud busy and put charges on customers) and consume cloud resources and this consumption charges will be applied on customers.

To avoid author has introduce concept called Combining Data Owner & Cloud Side Access Control. In this technique while uploading file user will generate secret data and encrypt that secret data with bloom filter algorithm and then encrypt file data with CP-ABE and then upload encrypted file with secret data and bloom filter data to cloud for storage. If any user wants to download file, then cloud will ask secret data from user and then encrypt that data with bloom filter and check existing data owner bloom filter with user bloom filter and if match found then only cloud send download file to user.

By applying secret data bloom filter match author has prevented EDoS attack, author introduce two technique two avoid EDoS attack

- 1) POP (Partially Outsource Protocol): using this technique cloud allow data owner to generate secret data for user verification before file download.
- 2) FOP (Fully Outsource Protocol): using this technique instead of user cloud will generate secret data with bloom filter

for user verification before download file.

This paper consists of 3 users

3.4.1 Data Owner: data owner will upload file and then using CP-ABE define access control and then encrypt data and then outsource encrypted data with secret key data for user verification. Sometime cloud may cheat customers by saying customer has consume this many resources and the author is saying big companies may not do that but still to prevent cloud from fraud usage cost author has provided customer an option to verify resource consumption. By using this option data owner can request cloud to provide details about his data usage or download.

3.4.2 Data User: this is the user of data which request cloud for file download and before download cloud will ask user for verification by entering secret data obtained from data owner. All data owners share their secret data with their data users.

3.4.3 Cloud Provider: This is a cloud server which store user data and performs user verification and provides resource consumption details to data owners.

For encryption and decryption, we are using CPABE algorithm. Below steps are involved to key generation, encrypt and decrypt data using CPABE

Attributes = "user1, user2, user3" //list of users assign to attribute variables who have access permission

Cpabe att = new Cpabe(); //creating object of CPABE class

```
String public_key =
file.getPath()+"/public.txt"; //file used to store
public key
```

```
String master_key =
file.getPath()+"/master.txt"; //files used to
store master key
```

```
String private_key =
file.getPath()+"/private.txt"; //file used to store
private key
```

```
att.setup(public_key, master_key); //here
cpabe object initialize with public and master
key file
```

```
att.keygen(public_key, private_key, master_key
, attributes); //here cpabe object generate key
based on given attributes. Attributes contains
names of users who are having permission to
access data after generating keys then user call
encrypt function to encrypt data by using keys
and attributes data. Below code used to
achieve encryption
```


```
Cpabe att = new Cpabe(); //creating object
of CPABE class
```

```
String public_key = input; //before encrypting
giving name and location public key file
att.enc(public_key, policy, encfile, encdata);
```


```
//now calling encryption function by using
public key and policy file (this also contains
peoples id who have permission to access
data), encfile is the plain file which will get
encrypted and then store to encdata file while
decryption will used below code Cpabe test =
new Cpabe();//creating object of CPABE class
test.dec(public_key, private_key, enc, dec.getPat
h()); //calling dec function to decrypt data
while calling this function we will pass private
key of person who is accessing data and enc is
the encrypted data and dec.getPath() is the file
location to which encrypted data will be
decrypted and save to dec.getPath()
```

So using above techniques we are encrypting and decrypting data and secret data with bloom filter can be applied by using algorithm called AEAD and secret data also called as CHALLENGE.


4. RESULTS




In above graph x-axis represents file name and y-axis represents execution time to encrypt and upload that file to cloud.



In above screen cloud is asking data user for secret data challenge and if user give correct data owner secret data, then only file will be downloaded otherwise not.



In above screen I am giving correct secret data and we can see file downloaded in browser status bar and in below screen I will give wrong secret data



After giving wrong secret challenge will get below screen

5. CONCLUSION

This paper proposed a solution to secure encrypted cloud storages from EDoS attacks. In addition, it also provided resource consumption accountability. Further, it utilized CP-ABE schemes in a black-box manner and complies with arbitrary access policy of CP-ABE. Finally, this paper presented two protocols for different settings, followed by performance and security analysis.

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