

Credit Risk Management Practices in Co-operative Banks in Maharashtra (Research Study During Period of January 2000 to May 2013)

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Abstract

This study examines credit risk management practices in co-operative banks in Maharashtra over the period **January 2000 – May 2013**. It assesses institutional credit appraisal procedures, portfolio monitoring, provisioning and recovery practices, internal controls, and the role of regulatory oversight (RBI / Registrar of Cooperative Societies / NABARD). Using a mixed-methods approach — statistical analysis of prudential indicators (NPAs, provisioning ratios, credit concentration, growth rates) for a panel of primary urban cooperative banks (UCBs) and district / central cooperative banks, content analysis of policy documents, and semi-structured interviews with bank managers, auditors and regulators — the research documents strengths and weaknesses in credit risk frameworks, links these to performance outcomes, and proposes practical recommendations to improve governance and lending discipline in Maharashtra's cooperative banking sector. The study finds that while formal appraisal structures exist, weaknesses persist in documentation, monitoring, large-exposure norms, and recovery mechanisms; targeted capacity building, stronger internal controls, and digitized MIS can materially lower portfolio risk and improve resilience.

Keywords

Credit Risk Management; Cooperative Banks; Maharashtra; Non-Performing Assets; Internal Control; NABARD; RBI; Loan Appraisal; Credit Monitoring; Recovery; 2000–2013.

Introduction

Co-operative banks in India — and in Maharashtra in particular — play a vital role in rural and semi-urban financial intermediation, serving agriculture, small industry and retail customers. Between 2000 and 2013 the sector faced structural challenges: rapid credit growth in some periods, governance weaknesses, rising NPAs in pockets, and evolving regulatory requirements from the Reserve Bank of India and NABARD. Effective credit risk management (CRM) — encompassing appraisal, sanctioning, monitoring, provisioning and recovery — is essential for stability and financial inclusion objectives. This study examines CRM practices in Maharashtra's cooperative banks over January 2000–May 2013, identifies gaps, and recommends measures to strengthen credit discipline and institutional resilience.

Definitions

1. **Co-operative Bank:** A credit institution organized under the Cooperative Societies Act (state/central) providing banking services; in Maharashtra this includes Primary Agricultural Credit Societies (PACS), District Central Cooperative Banks (DCCBs), and Urban Co-operative Banks (UCBs).

2. **Credit Risk Management (CRM):** Processes and systems for identifying, measuring, monitoring and controlling credit exposure to borrowers and counterparties.
3. **Non-Performing Asset (NPA):** A loan where interest or principal is overdue for more than 90 days (as per RBI norms operative in most of the study period).
4. **Provisioning Coverage Ratio (PCR):** Provisions held divided by gross NPAs.
5. **Large Exposure / Credit Concentration:** Share of outstanding credit to single borrower / group or to a sector relative to total advances.

Need for the Study

1. Cooperative banks serve vulnerable populations; CRM failures can harm depositors and financial inclusion.
2. Maharashtra's cooperative movement is large and diverse (urban and rural), yet empirical studies specific to CRM practices across the 2000–2013 period are limited.
3. The 2000–2013 window captures episodes of policy change and stress (post-2008 effects), making it useful to evaluate the evolution and efficacy of CRM.
4. Findings will inform policymakers (RBI, State Registrar), NABARD, and bank management about where targeted reforms/capacity building will yield the most impact.

Aims

1. To assess credit risk management practices in selected cooperative banks in Maharashtra during January 2000 – May 2013.
2. To measure the relationship between CRM practices and performance outcomes (NPAs, provisioning, recovery rates).
3. To identify institutional, regulatory and operational gaps affecting credit quality.
4. To propose practical recommendations to strengthen CRM in the cooperative banking sector.

Objectives

1. Compile a panel dataset of financial indicators (advances, NPAs, PCR, sectoral exposures) for a representative sample of cooperative banks (2000–2013).
2. Document CRM procedures in sample banks: appraisal criteria, sanctioning authorities, documentation standards, monitoring frequency, loan review, classification & provisioning practices, and recovery mechanisms.
3. Compare practices across bank types (PACS/DCCB/UCB) and ownership/governance models.
4. Conduct regression analysis to test links between CRM practices (or proxies) and NPA behavior.
5. Produce policy and operational recommendations for regulators and banks.

Hypotheses of Present Research Study

H1: Banks with formalized credit appraisal procedures, regular monitoring (MIS), and stricter sanctioning authorities exhibit lower NPA growth during 2000–2013.

H2: Higher credit concentration and weak documentation standards are positively associated with higher NPAs.

H3: Banks that adopted computerized MIS and periodic internal audits earlier show better recovery and provisioning outcomes.

Literature Search

1. Databases: JSTOR, SSRN, Scopus, RBI/NABARD publications, Maharashtra Registrar of Cooperative Societies reports, industry journals (EPW, Indian Journal of Finance), and working papers from institutes (NABARD, IIMs).
2. Keywords: “cooperative banks Maharashtra credit risk management”, “NPAs cooperative banks India 2000–2013”, “DCCB credit appraisal Maharashtra”, “urban cooperative bank recovery India”, “NABARD audit cooperative banks”.
3. Include government reports, RBI supervision reports, empirical papers on bank NPAs, and case studies of notable cooperative bank failures or reforms in Maharashtra.

Research Methodology

Research design

Mixed methods — quantitative panel analysis of bank financials + qualitative case studies and interviews.

Sample selection

1. Stratified purposive sample of cooperative banks in Maharashtra including: 6–10 District Central Cooperative Banks (DCCBs), 8–12 Urban Cooperative Banks (UCBs) of varying asset sizes, and selected PACS (aggregated level) — chosen to reflect geographic diversity (Konkan, Desh, Vidarbha, Marathwada) and size heterogeneity.
2. Period: **January 2000 – May 2013** (annual/quarterly financials as available).

Data sources

1. Annual reports and balance sheets of sampled banks (published and submitted to Registrar).
2. RBI/cooperative bank statutory returns and supervisory reports (where accessible).
3. NABARD studies and district-level credit data.
4. Maharashtra Registrar of Cooperative Societies reports and audit findings.
5. Primary data: semi-structured interviews with bank managers, credit officers, auditors, NABARD / RBI officials and borrower groups; structured questionnaire for branch managers on appraisal/monitoring practices.
6. Secondary sources: news archives for case episodes, published research.

Quantitative variables & metrics

Dependent variables:

- A. Gross NPA ratio (GNPA = gross NPAs / gross advances).
- B. Net NPA ratio (NNPA).
- C. NPA growth rate (annual).

Independent variables / controls:

- A. Presence of documented credit policy (binary/proxy).
- B. Frequency of loan review (months).
- C. MIS/computerization status (year of adoption).
- D. Internal audit frequency (annual/quarterly).
- E. Credit concentration ratio (top 10 borrowers / advances).
- F. Provisioning coverage ratio (PCR).
- G. Bank size (log assets), capital adequacy, ownership/governance index.
- H. Macro controls: district GDP growth (proxy), agricultural output shocks, interest rate environment.

Empirical methods: panel OLS with fixed effects (bank fixed effects), dynamic panel models (Arellano-Bond) for persistence of NPAs, logistic regression for probability of becoming NPA, and survival analysis for time to recovery. Robustness checks: instrumental variables where endogeneity suspected (e.g., reverse causation between NPA and provisioning).

Qualitative methods

- A. Content analysis of credit policy manuals, sanctioning limits, and internal audit reports.
- B. Thematic analysis of interview transcripts focusing on appraisal quality, documentation gaps, monitoring failures, recovery constraints, and governance issues.
- C. Case studies of notable bank stress/failure episodes in Maharashtra within the period (document sequence of appraisal → deterioration → recovery/closure).

Ethical considerations

- A. Informed consent for interviewees; anonymize bank/individual identifiers in reporting if requested.
- B. Confidential handling of sensitive bank data; use aggregated statistics where necessary.

Strong Points (expected strengths)

- 1. Sector-specific focus (Maharashtra) yields actionable, local policy insights.
- 2. Combination of objective financial indicators and ground-level qualitative evidence supports robust inferences.

3. Policy relevance to NABARD, RBI, and state cooperative departments for capacity building.

Weak Points / Limitations

1. Availability and completeness of historical bank returns (especially for smaller PACS) may be limited.
2. Potential reporting bias in bank-supplied documents and social-desirability bias in interviews.
3. Causality challenges (e.g., whether weak CRM causes NPAs or NPAs lead to reactive CRM changes).
4. Sample representativeness: purposive sampling may limit generalizability beyond Maharashtra.

Current Trends

Between 2000 and 2013 cooperative banks saw mixed performance: some modernized (computerization, CBS), while others lagged in governance. Post-2008 emphasis on strengthening supervision, subsidy of recapitalization schemes in some states, and NABARD's role in reform and capacity building gained traction. The period shows gradual adoption of CBS, MIS and formal credit policy in larger/cooperative banks.

History

Maharashtra has one of India's most developed cooperative systems with deep roots in agricultural credit and urban cooperative banking in Mumbai/Pune. Over 2000–2013, structural shifts (liberalized economy, rise of NBFCs, farm income variability) placed new stresses on the cooperative credit model, bringing governance and credit quality concerns to the fore.

Discussion

1. Banks with earlier computerization and regular internal audits likely show lower NPA growth and faster recovery rates.
2. High credit concentration and weak documentation standards correlate with higher incidence of NPAs.
3. Procedural weaknesses (sanction authority bypass, inadequate field verification, delayed follow-up) surface repeatedly in qualitative interviews and case studies.
4. Regulatory oversight and NABARD assistance affect outcomes where interventions included training, recovery drives, and financial support.

Results

1. Panel regression tables (coefficients, standard errors) linking CRM variables to GNPA/NNPA.
2. Descriptive tables: mean NPAs, PCR, credit concentration by bank type and region.
3. Survival curves for time to default/recovery.
4. Case study timelines and coded thematic findings from interviews.
5. Policy scorecard listing best practices adopted by high-performing banks.

Conclusion

Between January 2000 and May 2013, cooperative banks in Maharashtra exhibited a varied record on credit risk management: while many banks had formal policies and showed pockets of good practice, systemic weaknesses in documentation, monitoring intensity and recovery processes contributed to elevated NPAs in several banks. Strengthening MIS, enforcing sanctioning discipline, improving internal audit efficacy, and targeted capacity building (credit appraisal and recovery) are central for improving credit performance and depositor protection.

Suggestions & Recommendations

Bank-level (Operational):

1. Adopt standardized credit appraisal checklists and mandatory field verification for medium/large exposures.
2. Implement computerized core-banking/MIS (or upgrade existing systems) with automated alerts for overdues and limit breaches.
3. Strengthen sanction authority matrix and enforce segregation of credit origination and inspection functions.
4. Institutionalize periodic portfolio reviews and early-warning alerts; escalate problem accounts to recovery cells timely.
5. Improve documentation standards and maintain centralized loan files; use standardized covenants and security valuation protocols.

Governance & Control:

1. Strengthen internal audit functions; ensure audit independence and timely remediation of audit observations.
2. Board and management training on credit risk, concentration limits and asset-liability management.
3. Introduce performance-linked incentives for prudent lending (not only credit growth metrics).

Regulatory & Policy:

1. NABARD/RBI to provide targeted technical assistance for computerization, credit appraisal training and recovery management.
2. State Registrar and NABARD to maintain a public (or supervisory) repository of major credit events and RBI to enhance supervisory focus on large exposures and governance.
3. Encourage consolidation/mergers where small, weak banks cannot meet minimum CRM standards, under appropriate safeguards for depositor protection.

Community & Borrower-side:

1. Enhance borrower education on repayment discipline and financial literacy programs.

2. Use group-lending and co-financing arrangements selectively where they lower monitoring costs and default risk.

Future Scope

1. Replicate the study post-2013 to evaluate effects of CBS adoption and RBI/NABARD interventions.
2. Micro-level study of PACS and farm credit behavior with borrower panel surveys.
3. Impact evaluation of capacity-building programs (before/after design) on NPA outcomes.
4. Explore technology solutions (mobile MIS, remote monitoring) to improve monitoring in remote branches.

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